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aBstract
Punishment has mostly focused on achieving its objectives without con-
sidering the impact a sentence will have on the rights of the offender 
and those under the offender’s care. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, the author illustrates how the Court, relying on the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, has shifted the punish-
ment discourse from one that emphasises the objectives of punishment to 
one that calls upon sentencing officers to not only emphasise the objectives 
of punishment, but also to consider the effect the punishment will have on 
the children if their primary caregiver was sentenced to imprisonment.
1.  Introduction
‘... [T]he subject of punishment is complex, and ... it has inspired a rich body of 
philosophical, sociological and criminological literature ... The quality of our civ-
ilization is also gauged by how we treat those whom we define as wrongdoers ... 
[S]ince punishment is, after all, the deliberate imposition of pain and deprivation 
by the state on individuals, it behoves society to ensure that this imposition is 
kept within proper limits, and is inflicted only for proper purposes.’1
 ‘Disagreements about just punishments, like disagreements about the 
death penalty or abortion, are often in the end disagreements about power-
ful intuitions or deeply embedded values.’2
* LLB (Hons) (Makerere University), LLM (UP); LLM (UFS), LLD (UWC). Post-Doctoral 
Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. The author wrote this paper 
when he was a doctoral researcher at the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative 
(CSPRI), Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. I am grateful to Mr. 
Lukas Muntingh of CSPRI and to the anonymous referees for their comments on the 
earlier drafts of this paper. Ford Foundation’s funding to the CLC is acknowledged.
1 BA Hudson Understanding Justice: An Introduction to the Ideas, Perspectives and 
Controversies in Modern Penal Theory (2ed) (2003) 13. 
2 M Tonry ‘Parsimony and Desert in Sentencing’ in A von Hirsch and A Ashworth (eds) 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 2ed (1998) 200. 
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The subject of punishment3 is complex. Also complex is ‘the rela-
tionship between human rights and sentencing’.4 The Constitutional 
Court observed that ‘[s]entencing is innately controversial’5 and ‘always 
difficult.’6 For decades, scholars, judges and penal reformers of dif-
ferent backgrounds, have approached this contentious subject from 
different angles in an attempt to answer three important questions. 
First, ‘[w]hat justifies the general practice of punishment? [Second], 
[t]o whom may punishment be applied? [Third], [h]ow severely may 
we punish?’7 In attempting to answer these questions, various objec-
tives of punishment have emerged. These have included retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation (sometimes referred to as reform),8 and 
restorative justice. The first three are considered to be the traditional 
objectives of punishment,9 and restorative justice is considered to be 
relatively new although some South African courts have emphasised 
it.10 South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, have held 
in various decisions that punishment should be aimed at serving one 
or more of the above objectives.11 The history, meaning, strengths and 
weaknesses of the above objectives of punishment have been written 
about extensively for generations and it is against that backdrop that a 
conscious decision has been made to exclude the discussion of those 
issues in this paper.
In 1996, South Africa adopted a new Constitution which includes 
a progressive Bill of Rights which guarantees several rights that are 
directly and indirectly inseparable from the subject of punishment. 
3 It falls outside the ambit of this paper to deal with the definition of the concept of 
punishment.
4 D van Zyl Smit ‘Human rights and sentencing guidelines’ in J Sarkin et al (eds) 
Resolving the Tension between Crime and Human Rights: An Evaluation of European 
and South African Issues (2001) 296. 
5 M v The State (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curie) 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC) at para 
[10], 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC), 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC).
6 M v The State supra (n5) at para [66].
7 HAL Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) 3.
8 The Constitutional Court referred to the following as the ‘main purposes of punish-
ment’: deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution. However, it held that 
‘mercy as distinct from mere sympathy to the offender’ should also be added as 
an objective of punishment. See M v The State supra (n5) at para [10] (quoting the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Director of Public Prosecution, KwaZulu Natal v P 2006 
(3) SA 515 (SCA)). See also M v The State supra (n5) at para [109], where Madala J 
held that ‘the general objectives of sentencing are retribution, deterrence, prevention 
and rehabilitation.’ 
9 The Constitutional Court held that ‘deterrence, prevention, reformation and retribu-
tion’ are the ‘main objectives of punishment’, see S v Makwanyane and Others 1995 
(3) SA 391 (CC) at para [46].
10 SS Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 176 – 177 (on restora-
tive justice). 
11 Terblanche op cit (n10) 155–178.
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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Constitutional 
Court has approached the issue of punishment from a human rights 
perspective,12 and in particular the question of sentencing primary 
caregivers of children.
2.  Human dignity versus the objectives of punishment
The objectives of punishment approach punishment from three differ-
ent perspectives, each placing emphasis on one aspect. This approach 
was succinctly captured over four decades ago by Armstrong in his 
attempt to define punishment:
‘Irrespective of which problem or problems it sets out to solve, a theory of 
punishment can usually be put under one of three headings: Retributive, 
Deterrent, or Reformatory. When the problem is to define punishment these 
theories provide roughly the following answers:
1.  Retributive: Punishment is the infliction of pain, by an appropriate 
authority, on a person because he is guilty of a crime, i.e. for a crime 
that he committed. ...
2.  Deterrent: Punishment is the infliction of pain on a person in order 
to deter him from repeating a crime or to deter others from imitating 
a crime which they believe him to have committed … here … deter-
rence of the person punished is not reform. Reform means that the man 
intends to avoid repeating the crime, not from fear of punishment but 
because he sees that it was wrong.
3.  Reformatory: Punishment is the infliction of pain on a person in order 
to reduce his tendency to want to committee crimes or to commit crimes 
of a particular sort.’13
However, human rights considerations have eventually modelled the 
way punishment should be understood and imposed, and they have 
directed the role punishment should play in society. Without question-
ing the relevance or otherwise of each of the above theories of punish-
ment, human rights activists have been successful, to a large extent, 
especially with regard to the death penalty and corporal punishment, 
in arguing and demonstrating that punishment can achieve one or 
12 The Constitutional Court has also dealt with other important questions relating to the 
issue of punishment, the discussion of which fall outside the scope of this article. 
See for example, Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC), where the Court dealt with the issue of deporting 
a terrorist suspect to a country where he could be sentenced to death and executed; 
Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 
(CC), where the court dealt with the question of whether South Africa had a duty to 
protect its citizens who might be sentenced to death in a foreign country for offences 
committed in that country; and August and another v Electoral Commission and 
others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC), in which the Court dealt with the prisoners right to vote.
13 KG Armstrong, ‘The retributivist hits back’ (1961) 70 (280) Mind: New Series 478-
479. 
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more of the above objectives without violating some of the fundamental 
rights, such as the right not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.14 The Constitution expressly prohibits 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,15 as do some 
of the international human rights treaties to which South Africa is 
a state party.16 The question being turned to at this juncture is: To 
what extent has the constitutional prohibition of inhuman punishment 
impacted on the manner in which the Constitutional Court has dealt 
with the question of punishment in the light of the above-mentioned 
theories or objectives of punishment?
3.  The objectives of punishment in the light of the 
Constitution
Without giving details, the Constitutional Court held that ‘the traditional 
aims of punishment [have] been transformed by the Constitution’,17 
thus necessitating a fresh look at the question of punishment in light 
of the new constitutional dispensation. The Court’s jurisprudence 
has introduced a different approach to the punishment debate. Its 
jurisprudence, as discussed below, shows that before punishment 
is inflicted, the sentencing officer should at least have the following 
issues in mind. The first issue is whether the intended punishment 
does not violate the right to human dignity within the meaning of 
the Constitution. The second question is whether the punishment will 
achieve its intended objective or objectives. It is submitted that if the 
answer to the first question is positive, then that form of punishment 
should not be imposed even if it could serve the intended objective 
or objectives in the second question. However if the answer to the 
first question is negative, then the punishment may be imposed even 
if it may not achieve the objective or objectives contemplated in the 
second question. It is against this background that the Court held 
that the death penalty and corporal punishment were cruel, inhuman 
14 The death penalty as a deterrent or retributive form of punishment has been held in 
some jurisdictions to amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. See generally L Chenwi Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A 
Human Rights Perspective (2007) 97-147. 
15 Section 12(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16 For example, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(which South Africa ratified on 10 December 1998); and Article 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (which was ratified by South Africa on 9 July 
1996).
17 M v The State supra (n5) at para [10] (quoting the Supreme Court of Appeal in Director 
of Public Prosecution, KwaZulu Natal v P 2006 (3) SA 515 (SCA)).
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or degrading forms of punishment.18 Unlike the approach taken by 
some philosophers whereby they emphasise the moral justifications 
of punishment,19 the Court’s point of departure is the protection of 
human dignity and whether the contemplated form of punishment is 
in line with the Constitution. If the Court finds that the form of pun-
ishment would violate the offender’s right to human dignity, that form 
of punishment may be declared unconstitutional and the punisher will 
be ordered to devise other forms of punishment that would achieve 
the intended objectives without violating the offender’s right not to be 
subjected to inhuman treatment. When the death penalty was declared 
unconstitutional, the Court held that other forms of punishment, such 
as long-term imprisonment, could achieve the same objectives which 
the State argued the death penalty was serving.20
4.  Proportionality
Following from the above is the issue of proportionality between pun-
ishment and the offence committed. One of the criticisms of the deter-
rence and rehabilitation objectives of punishment is that the former 
may justify severe punishment, even in cases where the offence is 
not the most callous, so as to deter others from committing the same 
offence, and that the latter may justify indeterminate incarceration even 
in cases of minor offences if the state is of the view that this is what it 
would take to rehabilitate the offender. The above two examples raise 
the issue of proportionality. Van Zyl Smit opines that, although the 
principle of proportionality is not specifically mentioned in the Consti-
tution, it is nevertheless ‘well established in South African sentencing 
18 See S v Makwanyane and Others 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) on the question of the death 
penalty and S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) on the question of corporal 
punishment.
19 See for example, I Kant Rechtslehr, Part Second, (1887) 49 translated by E Hastie 
(cited in EL Pincoffs The Rationale of Legal Punishment (1966) 2-3); MA Drumbl 
‘The expressive value of prosecuting and punishing terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva 
Conventions, and International Criminal Law’ (2006-2007) 75 George Washington Law 
Review 1170; DA Crocker, ‘Punishment, reconciliation, and democratic deliberation’ 
(2002) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 509-549; D Markel, ‘State, be not proud: A 
retributivist defense of the commutation of death row and the abolition of the death 
penalty’ (2005) 40 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 438; J Brittana and 
RA Posner, ‘Classic revisited: Penal theory in Paradise Lost’ (2006-2007) 105 Michigan 
Law Review 1056; Y Lee ‘The constitutional right against excessive punishment’ (2005) 
91 Virginia Law Review 740; J Brooks ‘Addressing recidivism: Legal education in cor-
rectional settings’ (1991-1992) 44 Rutgers Law Review 712.
20 S v Makwanyane supra (n9) at paras [115]–[127].
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law’ and that ‘proportionality in sentencing is clearly required by the 
Constitution.’21 In Dodo v S the Court confirmed this:
‘To attempt to justify any period of penal incarceration ... without inquiring 
into the proportionality between the offence and the period of imprison-
ment, is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of human 
dignity. Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; 
they are creatures with inherent infinite worth; they ought to be treated as 
ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end. Where the length of 
a sentence, which has been imposed because of its general deterrent effect 
on others, bears no relation to the gravity of the offence ... the offender is 
being used essentially as a means to another end and the offender’s dig-
nity assailed. So too where the reformative effect of the punishment is pre-
dominant and the offender sentenced to lengthy imprisonment, principally 
because he cannot be reformed in a shorter period, but the length of impris-
onment bears no relationship to what the committed offence merits. Even in 
the absence of such features, mere disproportionality between the offence 
and the period of imprisonment would also tend to treat the offender as a 
means to an end, thereby denying the offender’s humanity.’22
The Court’s dictum above shows that even in cases where severe pun-
ishment would deter the criminal (specific deterrence) or potential 
criminals (general deterrence) such punishment must be proportional 
to the seriousness of the offence committed. In the case of rehabilita-
tion, lengthy prison terms cannot pass the constitutional test if they 
are disproportional to the seriousness of the offence. Even though the 
Court does not specifically mention the other objectives of punishment, 
the measures taken to punish the offender to achieve those objectives 
must also be proportional to the seriousness of the offence.23
21 D van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and punishment’ in S Woolman et al Constitutional Law 
of South Africa (2ed looseleaf) (2006) 49-9. 
22 Dodo v The State 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para [38].
23 It has to be recalled that proportionality is embodied in retribution. In rejecting the 
view that retribution is the same as revenge, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia held that ‘Retribution is not a desire for revenge but an expres-
sion of the outrage of the international community at these crimes. Accordingly, it 
should be seen as an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appro-
priate punishment which properly reflects the [...] culpability of the offender, having 
regard to the international risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused 
by the offender, and the normative character of the offender’s conduct. Furthermore, 
unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires 
the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.’ Prosecutor 
v Vujadin Popovic and others, Case No. IT-05-88-T (Judgment of 10 June 2010) at 
para [2128], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,ICTY,,BIH,,4
c1f69fe2,0.html, accessed on 29 June 2011. (Emphasis in original. Footnotes omit-
ted). It has also been argued that ‘‘… (a) retribution ends cycles of violence, whereas 
revenge fosters them; (b) retribution limits punishment to that which is in proportion 
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5.  The rights and interests of offenders’ children
Traditionally, punishment has always focused on the offender and the 
victims of his crime. The well-known Zinn triad requires that before 
imposing a sentence, the court should evaluate the following three 
factors: Firstly, the nature of the crime; secondly, the circumstances of 
the offender and, lastly, the interests of society.24 Van Zyl Smit, while 
suggesting a sentencing framework for South Africa that integrates 
human rights in sentencing, observes that ‘[a]n attempt is ... made to 
give an indication from a human rights perspective of what a sentenc-
ing framework should seek to achieve both for the offender and for the 
public at large, including the victims of crime.’25 He looks at punish-
ment both from the offender’s perspective and that of the victims of his 
crime and the public. This is an approach that all the above objectives 
of punishment take. The negative social consequences of punishment 
on the offender’s dependants have never been a major concern of the 
objectives of punishment or retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
restorative justice.
The Constitutional Court has reviewed this approach to punishment 
in cases where the imprisonment of a person who has not committed 
a very serious offence, who happens to be the primary caregiver of 
young children, would negate the constitutional requirement that in 
matters concerning children, the children’s interest shall be paramount. 
In M v The State,26 M was a 35-year-old single mother of three boys 
aged 8, 12 and 16 years. The Regional Court convicted her on several 
counts of fraud which she had committed over a period of years and 
sentenced her to four years’ direct imprisonment despite ‘strong pleas 
from her counsel’ and the fact that the correctional supervision report 
indicated that she ‘would be an appropriate candidate for a correc-
tional supervision order.’27 On appeal, the High Court quashed one 
of the convictions and reduced her sentence to that of imprisonment 
under section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, in 
terms of which she would be eligible for placement on correctional 
to the wrongdoing, whereas revenge is limitless in principle; (c) retribution is impar-
tially administered by the state, whereas revenge is often personal; (d) retributivists 
seek the equal application of the criminal law, whereas no generality attaches to 
the avenger’s interest; and (e) retribution is cool and unemotional, whereas revenge 
has a particular emotional tone of taking pleasure in the suffering of another.’ See R 
Nozick Philosophical Explanations (1981) 366-368 as quoted in D Markel ‘State, be 
not proud: A retributivist defense of the commutation of death row and the abolition 
of the death penalty’ (2005) 40 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 438.
24 See S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H. 
25 Van Zyl Smit op cit (n4) 296. 
26 M v The State supra (n5).
27 M v The State supra (n5) at para [2].
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supervision after serving eight months imprisonment.28 The High 
Court dismissed her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal against the substituted sentence. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal, without furnishing reasons, also rejected her petition for 
leave to appeal against the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the 
High Court. She thereafter applied to the Constitutional Court ‘for 
leave to appeal against the refusal of the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
hear her oral argument, as well as against the sentence imposed by 
the High Court.’29
The Constitutional Court enrolled her application for leave to appeal 
against the decision of the High Court.30 The issue at stake related 
to the duties of the sentencing court in light of section 28(2),31 of 
the Constitution and other relevant statutory provisions when the 
person to be sentenced to imprisonment is the primary caregiver of 
minor children.32 The Court held that ‘[t]he unusually comprehen-
sive and emancipatory character of section 28 presupposes that in 
our new constitutional dispensation the sins and traumas of fathers 
and mothers should not be visited on their children.’33 The Court 
added that ‘section 28 requires the law to make best efforts to avoid, 
where possible, any breakdown of family life or parental care that may 
threaten to put children at increased risk.’34 However, the Court drew 
a distinction between a ‘primary caregiver’35 and a ‘breadwinner’, 
and held that the inquiry should focus on whether the offender is a 
primary caregiver. This is clearly a departure from the traditional ways 
that philosophers, and even the Court itself, had previously looked at 
punishment and its role in society with regard to the offender. What 
the Court is saying here is that punishment may not violate the of-
fender’s right to human dignity and may achieve one or more of the 
known objectives of punishment, but the sentencing court is required 
to extend its investigation to establish the effect that imprisonment, as 
a form of punishment, will have on the offender’s dependants (where 
the offender is a primary caregiver of minor children). What the Court 
acknowledged is that there exists a social dimension to punishment 
28 M v The State supra (n5) at para [3].
29 M v The State supra (n5) at para [4].
30 M v The State supra (n5) at para [5].
31 Section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 provides 
that ‘[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning 
the child.’
32 M v The State supra (n5) at paras [6] & [7].
33 M v The State supra (n5) at para [18].
34 M v The State supra (n5) at para [20].
35 The court held that ‘a primary caregiver is the person with whom the child lives and 
who performs everyday tasks like ensuring that the child is fed and looked after and 
that the child attends school regularly.’ (M v The State supra (n5) at para [28]). 
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within the prescripts of the Constitution as they refer to the rights of 
children. The Court added the interests of the children placed at risk, 
if their primary caregiver is imprisoned, should not be ignored during 
sentencing. In the Court’s words, ‘[s]pecific and well-informed atten-
tion will always have to be given to ensuring that the form of punish-
ment imposed is the one that is least damaging to the interests of the 
children, given the legitimate range of choices in the circumstances 
available to the sentencing court.’36
The above pronouncement is a clear message to sentencing courts: 
Courts must ‘adequately’ balance all the interests involved, especially 
those of the children who would be placed at risk should their primary 
caregiver be imprisoned. The judicial mindset is not only required to 
be flexible but must, as a necessity, ‘change’ to accommodate constitu-
tional requirements in every sentence imposed in order to ensure that 
the best interests of the child receive ‘focused and informed attention.’ 
The Court is therefore alive to the fact that any form of punishment 
imposed on the primary caregiver of minor children will directly or 
indirectly impact on the interests of the child. However, if courts have 
to choose between two forms of punishment to decide which one to 
impose on the primary caregiver of minor children, they should lean 
towards the one that is the least restrictive on the interests of the 
children. However, the Court cautioned that,
‘[t]he purpose of emphasising the duty of the sentencing court to acknowl-
edge the interests of the children ... is not to permit errant parents unreason-
ably to avoid appropriate punishment. Rather, it is to protect the innocent 
children as much as is reasonably possible in the circumstances from avoid-
able harm.’37
The Court thus set the following guidelines that every court must 
follow when it comes to sentencing:
‘(a) A sentencing court should find out whether a convicted person is a 
primary caregiver whenever there are indications that this might be so. (b) 
A probation officer’s report is not needed to determine this in each case. 
The convicted person can be asked for the information and if the presid-
ing officer has reason to doubt the answer, he or she can ask the convicted 
person to lead evidence to establish the fact. The prosecution should also 
contribute what information it can; its normal adversarial posture should be 
relaxed when the interests of children are involved. The court should also 
ascertain the effect on the children of a custodial sentence if such a sentence 
is being considered. (c) If on the Zinn triad approach the appropriate sen-
tence is clearly custodial and the convicted person is a primary caregiver, the 
court must apply its mind to whether it is necessary to take steps to ensure 
that the children will be adequately cared for while the caregiver is incarcer-
36 M v The State supra (n5) at para [33].
37 M v The State supra (n5) at para [35].
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ated. (d) If the appropriate sentence is clearly non-custodial, the court must 
determine the appropriate sentence, bearing in mind the interests of the 
children. (e) Finally, if there is a range of appropriate sentences on the Zinn 
approach, then the court must use the paramountcy principle concerning 
the interests of the child as an important guide in deciding which sentence 
to impose.’38
In justifying suspending the four-year sentence that the High Court 
had imposed on M, the Constitutional Court held that it did so in the 
best interests of her three children because there was evidence that all 
‘three boys [relied] on M as their primary source of emotional security, 
and that imprisonment of M would be emotionally, developmentally, 
physically, materially, educationally and socially disadvantageous to 
them.’39 As the discussion above has illustrated, there are various 
points to be noted from the M judgment and it will remain a very 
important case on sentencing primary caregivers of young children for 
many years to come.40
5.1  The limited scope of M v S
Courts have considered the fact that an accused has dependants not 
only as one of mitigating circumstances,41 but also as one of the 
substantial and compelling circumstances within the meaning of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act,42 to avoid sentencing an offender to 
38 M v The State supra (n5) at para [36].
39 M v The State supra (n5) at para [67] & [68]-[69]. 
40 In J Pillay v The State 739/10 [2011] ZASCA 111 (1 June 2011), available at http://
www.saflii.org/za/cases /ZASCA/2011/111.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2011. in which 
the appellant, a 32-year-old mother and primary caregiver of six children of which 
two were aged eight and four years respectively, was convicted of fraud and 
attempted fraud and sentenced by the regional court to five years’ imprisonment, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal relied on, amongst other things, the reasoning in the 
Constitutional Court decision of M v S to set aside the sentence and remit the case 
to the regional court for re-sentencing. The facts of the case disclosed that the two 
reports which had been submitted to the magistrate at sentencing did not disclose 
how the imprisonment of the appellant would impact of the children (see paras [17] 
& [18]). In the light of the above, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that ‘[i]n order 
for a court to arrive at an informed decision concerning sentence the information ... 
[relating to the impact the imprisonment of the appellant would have on her chil-
dren] ... was required. A court having all that information before it might still decide 
... that incarceration is called for. Even if it does so it might with the information at 
hand be able to fashion an order that will ensure the continued well-being of the 
children, albeit in trying circumstances. On the other hand, it might, having all the 
information at hand decide against incarceration.’ See para [24]. Some of the deci-
sions in which M v S has been followed include S v EB 2010 (2) SACR 524 (SCA); S 
v GL 2010 (2) SACR 488 (WCC); S v Londe 2011 (1) SACR 377 (ECG) and S v Marais 
2009 (1) SACR 299 (E).
41 Terblanche op cit (n10) 197-198.
42 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
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a minimum prescribed sentence.43 However, as the Constitutional 
Court majority recently held in S v The State,44 the reasoning in M v 
The State is only applicable to primary caregivers of children because 
they are the ones protected under section 28 of the Constitution 
which formed the basis of the ruling. Thus where there is evidence 
that the children’s father, who is employed and stays in the same 
house with them and their mother, ‘is willing to care for them during 
[the mother’s] incarceration’ or that he will ‘be able to engage the 
childcare resources needed to ensure that the children are well 
looked after during his absence at work’,45 then the mother will not 
escape imprisonment. The reasoning in M v The State also excludes 
primary caregivers of elderly and disabled people. The impact is 
that breadwinners who are not the primary caregivers of children 
are excluded from the ambit of the judgment. The rationale is that, 
where possible, primary caregivers of young children should not be 
imprisoned because children need them for their survival and proper 
guidance.
6.  South Africa’s prisons in the eyes of the Constitutional 
Court
Many prisons in South Africa are overcrowded and plagued by gangs 
which make rehabilitation of offenders almost an unachievable objec-
tive.46 The prison system is also plagued by a significant number of 
unnatural deaths which happen in circumstances that mostly remain 
43 For example in S v Thebus and Another 2002 (2) SACR 566 (SCA), the appellants, 
who were members of a vigilante group, were convicted of murder. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that they had to be sentenced to life imprisonment unless there 
were substantial and compelling circumstances to justify the imposition of a lesser 
sentence as required by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. In sentencing 
them to 15 years’ imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the fact 
that they had families to support was one of the substantial and compelling circum-
stances. In S v Makatu 2006 (2) SACR 582 (SCA) the accused was convicted of murder 
and in sentencing him to 12 years’ imprisonment, instead of the ordained life impris-
onment, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the fact that he was responsible for 
the support of his children as one of the substantial and compelling circumstances 
that justified the imposition of a lesser sentence. 
44 S v S 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC).
45 S v S supra (n44) at para [63].
46 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (2009/2010) 
10, 15 & 60, available at http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/Annual%20
Report%202009%20-2010.pdf , accessed on 30 June 2011. 
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unknown to members of the public,47 such as sexual violence,48 inter-
prisoner violence,49 and assaults by warders on prisoners.50 Over-
crowding could be attributed to factors such as the large number of 
prisoners awaiting trial,51 and also that prisoners are serving longer 
prison terms.52 Corruption remains a challenge that the Department of 
Correctional Services (DCS) is yet to address.53 This gloomy picture is 
compounded by the fact that only 3% of the DCS’s R12 billion annual 
budget is allocated to the social integration programmes.54 The DCS 
is also facing acute shortages of professionals (i.e. social workers and 
psychologists) who are essential to the rehabilitation of offenders.55 
The question that remains to be answered is: How does the Constitu-
tional Court view the role of imprisonment as a form of punishment in 
light of the picture of South African prisons painted above?
The Court has looked at the prison system from two angles. In the 
first place, it recognises that prisons are overcrowded and that where a 
non-custodial sentence could be imposed, courts should do so because 
‘[i]t is in the public interest to reduce the prison population wherever 
47 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services op cit (n46) 26-30. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held in S v Magida 2005 (2) SACR 591 (SCA) that the 
sentencing court should take the health status of the offender into consideration 
before sentencing him/her to imprisonment, especially in cases where the offender 
was HIV positive and the Department of Correctional Services could not properly 
take care of the offender’s condition. While commenting on the Magida judgment, 
Sloth-Nielsen observed that ‘… the reality of prison conditions in South Africa must 
be factored into the sentencing process. After all, it is not solely the HIV status of the 
appellant that impelled the Supreme Court of Appeal to its decisions – it is this fact 
viewed in tandem with the actual conditions in prisons, such as prison overcrowd-
ing, exposure to infection, poor diet, and lack or [sic] proper medical treatment.’ See 
Julia Sloth-Nielsen ‘A new sentencing principle in the context of HIV/AIDS?’ (2005) 13 
Society Prison Reform Initiative Newsletter 1, available at http://www.communitylaw-
centre.org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiative/newsletters/newsletter/
newsletter%2013.pdf/, accessed on 30 June 2011. 
48 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons (2007/2008) 42, available at http://
www.community lawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiative/publi 
cations-1/other-resources/Annual%20Rep ort%202007-2008.pdf, accessed 30 June 2011. 
49 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services op cit (n46) 30. 
50 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons op cit (n48) 17. 
51 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services op cit (n46) 
11-14.
52 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services op cit (n46) 
14-15. 
53 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons op cit (n48) 17. See also Annual 
Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services op cit (n46) 37. 
54 L Muntingh ‘Correctional Services Budget 2007/08 to 2009/10’ (2007) 21 Civil Society 
Prison Reform Initiative Newsletter 1, available at http://www.communitylawcentre.
org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiat ive/newsletters/newsletter/news-
letter%2021.pdf/, accessed 30 June 2011. 
55 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons op cit (n48) 39 & 40.
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possible.’56 The Court is thus of the view that in order to reduce 
prison overcrowding in South Africa, the judiciary also has a role to 
play. Judicial officers should only impose direct imprisonment when it 
is absolutely called for. The Court also opines that the community still 
has a role to play in reforming offenders, meaning that judicial officers 
should not close their eyes to the fact when a choice has to be made 
between a custodial and a non-custodial sentence. The Court held that 
where an offender is suitable for community service but is sentenced 
to imprisonment, it is an indication that ‘community resources are 
incapable of dealing with her moral failures.’57
The Constitutional Court has also emphasised correctional supervi-
sion for a number of reasons. In the first place it aims at achieving the 
objective of the legislature, that it is not only those ‘who ought to be 
removed from society and imprisoned’ that should be sentenced to cus-
todial sentences but that correctional supervision should be imposed 
on those offenders who ‘although deserving of punishment, should not 
be so removed [from society]’.58 The Court added that correctional su-
pervision has the primary focus of rehabilitating offenders as opposed 
to emphasising retributory objectives and it aims at ‘humanising the 
criminal justice system.’59 It gives the sentencing court wide discre-
tion in imagining several sentencing measures,60 such as house arrest, 
monitoring, community service and placement in employment; it dis-
courages ‘imprisonment with all its known disadvantages for both the 
prisoner and the broader community.’ Correctional supervision should 
not be misunderstood as indicative of a criminal justice system that 
has ‘gone soft’ on crime, it is evidence that ‘[a]n enlightened society 
will punish offenders [appropriately and effectively] but will do so 
without sacrificing decency and human dignity,’61
‘It is an innovative form of sentence, which if used in appropriate cases and 
if applied to those who are likely to respond positively to its regimen, can 
56 M v The State supra (n5) at para [75]. This was not the first time a South African court 
considered the issue of prison conditions and their relevance to sentencing. In S v 
Holder 1979 (2) SA 70 (A) at 71, the court observed, inter alia, that South Africa’s 
prisons were ‘overfull’ and that in cases where direct imprisonment is not necessary, 
courts should consider alternatives to imprisonment. It was held that ‘[t]he approach 
that imprisonment ought not to be lightly imposed, especially if the objects of pun-
ishment can be met by another form of punishment, e.g. a fine with or without sus-
pended imprisonment, is a healthy approach.’
57 M v The State supra (n5) at para [75].
58 M v The State supra (n5) at para [58]. Chapter IV of the Correctional Services Act 111 
of 1998 provides for a detailed regime governing correctional supervision.
59 M v The State supra (n5) at para [58].
60 M v The State supra (n5) at para [64].
61 S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at para [68], quoted with approval in M 
v The State supra (n5) at para [58].
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serve to protect society without the destructive impact incarceration can 
have on a convicted criminal’s innocent family members. Thus, it creates a 
greater chance for rehabilitation than does prison, given the conditions in 
our overcrowded prisons.’62
The Court held that ‘[c]orrectional supervision is a multifaceted ap-
proach to sentencing comprising elements of rehabilitation, repara-
tion, and restorative justice.’63 Correctional supervision serves both 
rehabilitative and deterrence objectives of punishment. Correctional 
supervision ‘is geared to punish and rehabilitate the offender within 
the community leaving his or her work and domestic routines intact, 
and without the negative influences of prison.’64
7.  Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the Constitutional Court is of the 
view that punishment should serve one or more of the objectives of 
punishment (i.e. deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation) but that it 
should not violate the offender’s right to human dignity. The jurispru-
dence discussed above shows that the Constitution has brought, as it 
should, a new perspective to the manner in which courts should ap-
proach the question of punishment. Forms of punishment that infringe 
the offender’s right to human dignity may not be imposed regardless 
of how effective they may be in achieving one or more of the above 
objectives of punishment. The Constitutional Court has also not been 
blind to the collateral impact of imprisonment. If a court is to impose 
a sentence on a primary caregiver of young children, it should pay 
sufficient attention to the impact the sentence is likely to have on the 
interests of those children. Punishment in this case is not only focus-
ing on the offender and the interests of society, but also on the of-
fender’s children or dependants. The Court is aware of the conditions 
in the prison system and is of the view that imprisonment should be 
avoided as far as possible in order to ameliorate overcrowding in the 
prisons and also to give the community an opportunity to rehabilitate 
the offender. It highlights the importance of community corrections 
as alternatives to imprisonment. One of the most important questions 
that the Court may have to answer in the near future is whether the 
state of overcrowding in many South African prisons does not amount 
to inhuman and degrading treatment.
62 M v The State supra (n5) at para [61].
63 M v The State supra (n5) at para [59].
64 M v The State supra (n5) at para [62].
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